THE BEYOND OBITER LAW BLOG: Legal News
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The Supreme Court has held that the mere prescription of a distinct limitation period under a special statute does not automatically exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court clarified that delay in filing an appeal can be condoned unless the special enactment expressly excludes Section 5 or such exclusion arises by necessary implication from the language, object, and scheme of the statute.
The judgment was delivered by a Bench comprising Justice B. V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan while allowing an appeal arising under the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.
The appellant had challenged an externment order (preventive measure directing a person to leave and remain outside a specified area for a prescribed period to maintain public order and prevent criminal activities) before the State Government under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. However, the appeal was dismissed solely on the ground that it had been filed beyond the prescribed period of thirty days. The Chhattisgarh High Court declined to interfere, leading the appellant to approach the Supreme Court.
The principal issue before the Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act stood excluded in relation to appeals filed under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam.
The Court began by reiterating that the right to appeal is a substantive statutory right, while limitation provisions regulate the remedy rather than extinguish the underlying right. Referring to its earlier jurisprudence, the Bench observed that limitation laws are intended to ensure diligence and certainty in litigation and should not be interpreted to defeat valuable statutory remedies unless the legislature has clearly so provided.
Examining Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Court noted that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that contained in the Limitation Act, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5 - continue to apply unless their operation is expressly or impliedly excluded.
The Bench observed:
“..whenever there is a special enactment prescribing a limitation period distinct from the Limitation Act, it falls for the courts to determine whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded. In Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the expression that occurs is ‘expressly excluded by special or local law’. But, with the passage of time, the expression 'expressly excluded' has been interpreted to also include ‘exclusion by necessary implication’, having regard to the scope, object and scheme of the special law.”
The Court clarified that the applicability of Section 5 cannot be rejected merely because a special statute prescribes its own limitation period. Instead, courts must examine the statutory language and legislative intent to determine whether the power to condone delay has been excluded.
The Bench further observed:
“...the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be decided from the language, object, and scheme of the special or local enactment in question... while a special statute may prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself will not automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.”
Referring to earlier decisions including Mukri Gopalan, Hukumdev Narain Yadav, Popular Construction Company, Hongo India, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board, and Bengal Chemists, the Court explained that Section 5 has been held inapplicable only where the concerned statute contains clear language or a legislative scheme indicating that the prescribed limitation is absolute.
Applying these principles, the Court found that Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam merely requires an appeal to be filed within thirty days and does not employ restrictive expressions such as “but not thereafter” or prescribe any maximum outer limit for condonation of delay. The statute also does not constitute a self-contained limitation code and, in fact, incorporates principles of the general law by excluding the time required for obtaining certified copies while computing limitation.
The Court further emphasised that the appellate remedy under the Adhiniyam serves as an important procedural safeguard, since externment orders have significant consequences affecting an individual’s liberty, freedom of movement, livelihood and reputation. In such circumstances, the Court held that the right of appeal should not be defeated on technical grounds in the absence of a clear legislative mandate.
Observing that limitation law is intended to regulate remedies rather than extinguish rights, the Bench held that where the legislature has not expressly excluded the power to condone delay, an interpretation advancing substantial justice must prevail.
Holding that neither the text nor the scheme of the Adhiniyam excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the statutory appeal presented by the appellant before the State Government, and directed that it be decided on merits expeditiously. Consequently, the judgment of the Chhattisgarh High Court was set aside.